This article analyses the reaction to Garibaldi in Ireland during the Risorgimento, a reaction which, in its negativity, generally contrasted with the 
It is important to note at this stage that, in the words of R.V.
Comerford, 'A "nationalist" catholic identity was the largest political fact of Irish life in the mid-nineteenth century. ' (1998, 31) . Thus, in the spring of 1860, when Pius IX, fearful of an invasion of his territories, appealed for aid and protection from the wider Catholic world, the Irish responded to this call to arms and troops started to arrive in Italy in the summer of 1860 (Berkeley 1929; O'Carroll 2008; Cryan Pancani 1986; Paganini 1976; Larkin 1987) . The decision to send an Irish Papal Brigade to Italy in 1860 is a crucial element in the understanding of the relationship between Garibaldi and Ireland. These troops, who were much celebrated on their departure from Ireland, were ridiculed in the Italian press and encountered open hostility from the locals in the areas they had gone out to protect. Irish military involvement in Italy stretched to only a few months as most of the Papal States were surrendered in the autumn of 1860. There appears to have been a complete lack of understanding between the two nationalisms at this time of propaganda and warfare and this lack of understanding continued in the Irish depiction of Garibaldi when he was seen (in Catholic circles) in very black and white terms as an aggressive anti-clericalist at best, and a rabid anti-Christ at worst.
The ill-fated military venture of the Irish Papal Brigade was highly emotive and generated feelings of frustration and injustice which were to influence Irish-Italian relations for years to come (D'Angelo 1976) . The lack of empathy between Ireland and Italy in the nineteenth century was mutual. On the Italian side, Mazzini had a very ambivalent attitude towards Ireland; in general he did not support Irish independence but expressed support for some Irish patriot leaders. Other Italians such as Gioberti and Cavour felt little sympathy with Ireland, viewing the country more as Britain's problematic region than as a potential national unit (Finelli 2007, 90-99) . The Irish in turn were very influenced by their religious allegiances in their attitudes towards Italian unification.
Indeed, the interaction between Ireland and the Papal States in the 1860s impacted on the emergence and dominance of a form of Catholic nationalism in Ireland: stoked by events in Italy, Irish nationalism rose to a remarkable new crescendo of pro-papal enthusiasm and fervour (Larkin 1987, 7; Gilley 1973, 701) . The Papal cause came to be identified with the cause of Ireland, thus illustrating the intertwining of Irishness and Catholicism in this era (O'Brien 2005, 301 During the period of Irish involvement in the Papal States, it is interesting to note the depiction of Garibaldi in the Irish press and in particular in The Nation.
2 The gradual unification of Italy was seen in this paper as sacrilegious robbery by infidels, directed by individuals who were the proponents of treason, sedition, rebellion and immorality. It was maintained that the clergy were regularly treated badly (20 October 1860) and the people of Ireland were warned to beware of the 'deadly virus of Garibaldian teaching' (22 September 1860) . Indeed, from this era, the adjective 'Garibaldian' was used as a negative descriptor and the followers of Garibaldi were described as 'filibusters'. Russell government, to be his enemy in a more fundamental way. ' (1983, 223) . Irish people only became more aware of the nuances of the upheaval in
Italy following the return of the Papal Brigade, who realised that they had been 'dying for people who did not want to be died for.' (Berkeley 1929, 51) .
In general terms, it can be observed that the Italian Risorgimento brought Italy and England closer together but it only served to further distance
Ireland from any empathy with either country (Buschkühl, 1982; McIntire, 1983; Matsumoto-Best, 2003 The barbs and accusations sent back and forth between England and
Ireland formed part of a particularly heated and emotional exchange and looking back on the period, the editor of The Nation said that although often bitter and passionate words had passed between the English and Irish press, he doubted 'if ever the language of taunt and contumely on the one hand, and of hatred and defiance on the other, proceeded to greater lengths than on this occasion.' (Sullivan 1878, 216 in Irish nationalist opinion, the former had chosen to join a larger unit, the latter had not. The key factor for Irish nationalists was the right to choose Garibaldi, who is not a Sicilian, collected an armed force, who were not Sicilians, with which he invaded Sicily, and got up a rebellion in that country against its Sovereign. For doing which all England cheered him frantically, and pronounced him a hero, a liberator, a saviour. Garibaldi, it is believed, intends to proceed from Sicily to Naples and get up a rebellion in that country against its Sovereign, and from Naples to Rome to effect a similar object. And all England calls out to him to go on, and wishes him a speedy and complete success. 
Support for Garibaldi in Ireland
There were, however, elements in Irish society sympathetic to the Italian cause and to Garibaldi. These sympathies generally came from the minority (Riall 2007, 300) . There was also a report (subsequently discredited) that a ship containing 28,000 muskets for Garibaldi passed through Cork Harbour (Bowen 1983, 199 ). If we are to believe a correspondent to The Irish Times, the Irish troops fighting on Garibaldi's side made a good impression and the letter writer further claims that:
[…] in spite of the efforts of a priestly faction to prove to the contrary, [Garibaldi] has expressed his firm conviction that the Papal Brigade Cullen was similarly targeted in The Times and the Brigade was often referred to as Dr. Cullen's Irish Brigade.
Cullen was particularly involved in perpetuating the memory of the Papal Brigade and to this end he organised masses in honour of the deceased Irish troops. 20 The paraphernalia of the Church and its extensive influence was used to ensure that the Brigade did not slink home as a defeated army but instead that their actions were heralded and celebrated in their native land. He continued to offer masses in relation to Italian events, for example, on 17
November 1867 High Mass was celebrated for the Papal soldiers who had been killed in the latest 'Garibaldian invasion'. 21 Cullen used these occasions to vent his opinions on Italy from the pulpit and in such a manner, the events in Italy and the consequent hostile depiction of Garibaldi continued to be present in Irish public opinion.
Garibaldi was often the specific target of Cullen's ire at events in Italy.
In 1867, Cullen gave a sermon where he recounted a story he had been told Cullen followed events in Italy closely organising yet another collection in 1867 and writing that he was glad to hear that Kirby and the students at the Irish College had not been 'molested by the Garibaldians'. 24 His fear of Garibaldi's activities continued throughout the decade and in 1868, he wrote to Kirby worried that Garibaldi would be encouraged by the success of the Spanish Revolution. 25 The Archbishop seems to have had a hierarchy in terms of his disapproving assessment of revolutionary movements.
Therefore, although he commented that the three Fenians who were executed in 1867 for their revolutionary activity were 'scoundrels', he added that 'they were not half as bad as the Garibaldians'. 26 31 Another writer claimed that her heart rejoiced at the defeat of Garibaldi and added that 'The Garibaldians in this country are all terror stricken at the thought of their great hero being put down. Garibaldi in all these attacks on his name in Ireland is that no matter how badly he was depicted in the country, he probably was considered less dangerous than Mazzini (Barr 2008) . For example in 1867, even the conservative Irish Times commented that 'Garibaldi, indeed has been driven from the scene, but the Arch-plotter, Mazzini takes his place, endowed with infinitely greater powers for mischief.' (15 November 1867).
Conclusion
As can be seen from the above discussions, any reaction to Garibaldi in (Comerford 1998, 65) . 7 Evidence of the strength of feeling can also be seen by the riots which accompanied the talk of the pro-Garibaldi speaker Alessandro Gavazzi in Galway in 1859 and in Tralee in 1862. Gavazzi, who went on to become an army chaplain with Garibaldi, had a history of incensing audiences with his anti-Papal rhetoric. 8 'But what would be the objectives of an Irish Brigade in an Italian war? Not mere employment, for there is plenty of that at home; for the assertion of a patriotic principle, for that principle would be on the other side, neither could they be promoting Catholic interests, for all their success must be obtained at the expense of Catholics. One thing only would they be doing -they would be helping to establish in tyrannical strength a Government against which its own subjects had risen as utterly intolerable, and that, in our humble opinion, it is not exactly a work in which it is desirable to assist.' The Times, 19 May 1860. See also Larkin (1987, 406 
